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Meale: Misprision of Felony: A Crime Whose Time has Come, Again
THE CONDITIONAL LIABILITY RULE

appeal to logic and a genuine sense of justice. What lends dignity to
the law founded on precedent is that, if analyzed, the particularly cited
case wields authority by the sheer force of its self-integrated honesty,
integrity, and rationale. A precedent . . . should not control if its
strength depends alone on the fact that it is old, but may crumble at
the slightest probing touch of instinctive reason and natural justice.""
DONALD L. GIBSON

MISPRISION OF FELONY:
A CRIME WHOSE TIME HAS COME, AGAIN
Since the notorious Genovese murder in Queens, New York, where 88 witnesses refused to come to the aid of the victim, reported episodes of similar
bystander indifference to violent crime have proliferated. 2 Yet even in the face
of the inevitable public indignation accompanying such incidents, there presently exists virtually no legal duty on the citizen's part to report the occurrence
of serious crime. Such negligence, 3 however, has not always been free from
criminal sanctions. At common law, a citizen was required to intervene actively
in order to prevent the commission of a serious crime. The failure of an individual to satisfy this obligation constituted the misdemeanor of misprision of
4
felony.
88. Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 183, 142 A.2d 263, 274 (1958) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
1. In the early morning hours of March 13, 1964, 28 year old Catherine Genovese, returning from work to her home in a quiet residential area in Queens, New York, was attacked by a lone man wielding a knife. The resulting disturbance of her neighbors, who,
hearing her screams for help, came to their windows, twice drove off the attacker, but not
before he had stabbed Ms. Genovese several times. When the attacker realized that none of
the 38 witnesses would come to the woman's aid - or even call the police - the man attacked Ms. Genovese a third time and -an incredible 35 minutes after the initial attack finally succeeded in killing his victim. Police later noted that a single phone call would have
saved Ms. Genovese's life. N.Y. Times, March 27, 1964, at 1, col. 4. See generally A. ROSENTHAL, THIRTY-EIGHT WITNESSES (1964).

2. Ironically, another instance of bystander indifference occurred in the Genovese
neighborhood involving one of the same 38 witnesses. The witness in this case, hearing sounds
of a "fierce struggle" emanating from a single girl's apartment next door, failed to call the
police because she felt it was the responsibility of the building superintendent, who was out
of the building at that time. The girl's body was discovered later that morning -Christmas
Day. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Dec. 27, 1974, §A, at 12, col. 2.
3. The tort connotations of the word "negligence" are not entirely inappropriate here.
The criminal and civil forms of liability attaching to omissions are theoretically quite similar.
See generally W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THm LAw OF TORTs §56 (4th ed. 1971).
4. The history of misprision is uncertain. See generally Sykes v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 528, 45 Crim. App. 230 (1961); Allen, Misprision, 78 L.Q. REv. 40 (1962);
Glazebrook, Misprision of Felony -Shadow or Phantom?, 8 Am. J. LEGAL HisT. 189-208, 283-
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Through an analysis of the limited number of misprision cases, this commentary initially endeavors to identify those features of the crime that have
caused judicial consternation because of the threat they pose to individual
liberty. Next, the social problems of crime, particularly in terms of the individual's perception of crime and his ensuing response, are briefly considered
to determine the appropriateness of criminalizing misprision. And, finally, this
commentary recommends guidelines for a possible statutory reformulation of
misprision that accommodates simultaneously the societal interest in crime
deterrence and individual interest in freedom and privacy.
JUDICIAL REPUDIATION OF MISPRISION

Misprision of a felony is .

.

. a criminal neglect either to prevent a

felony from being committed or to bring the offender to justice after its

commission, but without such previous concert with or subsequent assistance of him as will make the concealer an accessory before or after
the fact. 5

Although there is some controversy as to whether misprision even existed at
common law,6 most courts that have considered the question have assumed to
some degree the historical existence of the crime.? Generally, however, American courts have refused to acknowledge the offense as it traditionally existed.
An analysis of the cases in which the crime of misprision has been judicially

302 (1964); Glazebrook, How Long Then Is the Arm of the Law To Be?, 25 MODERN L. REV.
301 (1962); Recent Cases, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 338 (1941). Some writers doubt whether misprision
ever required actual intervention beyond mere reporting. See, e.g., Frankel, Criminal Omissions: A Legal Microcosm, 11 WAYNE STATE L. REV. 367, 418-19 (1965). Most courts and
writers do not consider the requirements of the crime, as it is interpreted for modern application, to include the duty to rescue. See, e.g., Sykes v. Director of Public Prosecutions,
[1962] A.C. 528, 563-64, 45 Crim. App. 230, 250 (1961); W. LEFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW 526 (1972).

5. State v. Biddle, 2 W. W. Harr. 401, 403, 124 A. 804, 805 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1923); State v.
Wilson, 80 Vt. 249, 67 A. 533 (1907). See State v. Flynn, 100 R.I. 520, 521, 217 A.2d 432, 433
(1966) (same definition with two inconsequential changes in wording).
6. See generally two articles by Glazebrook, supra note 4; Allen, supra note 4. Several legal
historians have described the crime as "practically obsolete." See, e.g., 2 H. STEPHEN, HISTORY
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 238 (1883), cited in R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 515 n.17
(1969); 1 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW §289 (12th ed. 1932). Contra, G. WILIAMS, CRIMINAL
LAW: THE GENERAL PART 423 (2d ed. 1961); Goldberg, Misprision of Felony: An Old Concept
in a New Context, 52 A.B.A.J. 148 (1966).
7. See, e.g., Sykes v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1962], A.C. 528, 555-60, 45 Grim. App.
230, 240-46 (1961) (court rejected Glazebrook's argument against existence of misprision,
which was submitted in

the form of an amicus curiae brieo.

Contra, United States v.

Worcester, 190 F. Supp. 548, 565-66 (D. Mass. 1960) (court, listing many authorities doubting
existence of misprision at common law, itself expressed doubt that the mere silent observation of crime without reporting its occurrence was ever a common law crime). See also Branz-

burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 695, 697 (1972), where the Court, although not interpreting misprision strictly as it existed at common law, nevertheless noted in dictum: "It is apparent
from this statute [18 U.S.C. §4 (1970); see text accompanying notes 34-36 infra], as well as
from our history and that of England, that concealment of crime and agreements to do so
are not looked upon with favor."
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repudiated reveals the serious defects inherent in the criminalization of this
behavior.
Courts have repudiated misprision in one of two ways. Often, cases have
been controlled by statutes incorporating into state law those otherwise un8
codified common law crimes that were not inconsistent with state legislation.
Consequently, these courts have exercised either an implied or express discretionary power to evaluate the suitability of a particular common law crime
to contemporary social conditions and have found as a matter of law that misprision is philosophically unsuited to the needs of modem American society.9
Such findings of philosophical inappropriateness, which were generated by the
reluctance of courts to criminalize "merely" negligent behavior, have probably
been responsible for the decisions demonstrating the second method by which
courts have repudiated misprision.'0 Through reinterpretation of the elements
of the crime, courts have read into misprision additional requisites that have
functionally eliminated the crime by merging it with other crimes such as
accessory after the fact." By this method, some courts have demanded that the
12
accused's "neglect" be intentional - the product of an evil motive or intent.
Other courts have required that the accused's "ommission" or "failure to act"
be accompanied by a positive act of concealment. 3
The cases that merely determined that misprision was ill-suited to the requirements of modern society are most enlightening because they focused directly on the philosophical inappropriateness of the crime.14 Accordingly, in
Holland v. State,'9 a Florida court, exercising its discretion in the selection of
those common law crimes to be incorporated into the current law, recently
found misprision incompatible with "American criminal law" and therefore
excluded it from the substantive law of Florida.' 6 The uniqueness of the facts
in Holland is typical of most misprision cases. Holland, then city manager of
Pinellas Park, was charged with misprision of felony when he failed to report
8. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §775.01 (1973). See generally Comment, Misprision of Felony: A
Reappraisal,23 EMORY L.J. 1095, 1108 n.73 (1974) (list of jurisdictions with similar "reception statutes").
9. See Holland v. State, 302 So. 2d 806, 808 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); People v. Lefkowitz,
294 Mich. 263, 270, 293 N.W. 642, 643 (1940). See generally Day, Extent to Which the English
Common Law and Statutes Are in Effect, 3 U. FLA. L. REv.303 (1950).
10. See text accompanying notes 30-40 infra; accord, 32 VA. L. REv. 170, 171 (1948) (writer
suggests Lopes court should have expressly stated what they impliedly did - reject the common law crime of misprision).
11. See note 40 infra.
12. Commonwealth v. Lopes, 318 Mass. 453, 459, 61 N.E.2d 849, 852 (1945); State v. Wilson, 80 Vt. 249, 254-55, 67 A. 533 (1907).
13. State v. Michaud, 150 Me. 479, 483, 114 A.2d 352, 354 (1955); People v. Lefkowitz, 294
Mich. 263, 269-70, 293 N.W. 642, 643 (1940). The federal courts have also added this element
to the crime of misprision. See cases cited note 36 infra.
14. See, e.g., Holland v. State, 302 So. 2d 806, 808-11 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974). But cf. People
v. Lefkowitz, 294 Mich. 263, 270, 293 N.W. 642, 643 (1940) (court using additional element
of a positive act of concealment nevertheless reached the question of the suitability of the
crime to "American criminal law').
15. 302 So. 2d 806 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
16. Id. at 811.
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the assistant city manager for a felonious possession of marijuana. With the
prior cooperation of the city police chief and the subsequent approval of
seventeen community leaders, Holland chose instead to save the city from potential embarrassment and allowed the assistant to resign in return for a
promise not to prosecute.
Several factors accounted for the decision in Holland. Among them was the
characteristic vagueness of the crime of misprision.17 The court narrowly
interpreted misprision to consist of "the bare failure of a person with knowledge of the commission of a felony to bring the crime to the attention of the
proper authorities." ' From this reasonable definition of misprision, it was impossible for the court to determine the identity of the "proper authorities" and
the kind of knowledge of crime - direct or vicarious - for which a person may
reasonably be held liable. In Holland, it was arguable that the petitioner had
performed his duty when he informed the police chief of the crime and that
the chief and other community leaders were themselves guilty of misprision for
their failure to prosecute a crime of which they became aware through petitioner's reporting.'9
Two more important factors may also have contributed to the Holland
decision. First, the crime concealed in Holland was that of a felonious possession of two mature marijuana plants. In a frequently cited 20 statement, Chief
Justice Marshall revealed an underlying reason for the hostile judicial reception accorded crimes of omission, particularly the concealment of less serious
crimes. Marshall wrote:
It may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and to proclaim
every offense which comes to his knowledge; but the law which would
punish
him in every case, for not performing this duty, is too harsh for
21

man.

The outcome of most misprision cases depends on the balancing of two opposposing interests - that of society in reducing crime and that of the individual
in preserving his freedom from the responsibility of reporting crime. 2 The re17. Nearly all legal writers, whether in favor of or opposed to misprision laws, have indicated that the vagueness of the crime is its most serious defect. See, e.g., Allen, supra note
4, at 60; Glazebrook, How Long Then Is the Arm of the Law To Be?, 25 MODERN L. REv.
301, 316-17 (1962); Howard, Misprisions, Compoundings and Compromises, 1959 CRuM. L. REv.
750. See also Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLO. L. REv.
701, 751 n.175 (1937): "The traditional justification of the rule [imposing criminal liability
only in cases where there is a duty created by statute or contract and not in any case of
omission] does not carry the dogma of individualism to the point of denying the desirability
of stimulating action on a wider scale. It rests upon the ground that no broader rule can be
formulated which is not too indefinite as a measure of liability." Other writers taking a more
charitable view of misprision but nevertheless noting its vagueness include: G. WILLIANsS,
supra note 6, at 425; Frankel, supra note 4, at 425.
18. Holland v. State, 302 So. 2d 806, 807 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
19. ld. at 808-09.
20. See, e.g., id. at 809.
21. Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 556, 575-76 (1822).
22. "The issue here is whether or not freedom to remain inactive serves ends that are sufficiently desirable to compensate for the evil that inaction permits to befall. The extent of
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sult of such balancing is highly dependent on the facts of the individual case.2 3
For this reason, the crime of misprision of treason, which unlike misprision of
felony, 24 concerns the gravest social crime and thereby serves a societal interest
of paramount importance, has tended, in theory at least, to survive. 25 Therethe burden imposed by the act is obviously a relevant factor in making such an evaluation.
If the burden is negligible or very light, the case for liability is strong, and the difficulty of
formulating a general rule no more insuperable an obstacle than in the case of acts."
Wechsler & Michael, supra note 17, at 751 n.175.
Wechsler and Michael omit to mention in their discussion the societal interest in reduced
crime. Compensating for the cost of burdened personal freedom is the social gain to be
realized in terms of reduced crime. In the case of misprision, where the burden of reporting
crime can be modified only slightly, it is important to heighten the social benefit by restricting misprision laws to only the most serious subject-matter crimes. See text accompanying notes 23-26 infra. Many writers advocate such a restriction. See, e.g., G. WILLIAMS, supra
note 6, at 423.
In an exceptionally lucid examination of the social benefits involved in this issue, one
court found that criminal liability for the omission by the owner of a telephone answering
service to withdraw positively from a prostitution conspiracy with which he was marginally
involved was dependent on the severity of the subject-matter crime. "The duty to take positive action to dissociate oneself from activities helpful to violations of the criminal law as
[sic] far stronger and more compelling for felonies than it is for misdemeanors or petty offenses ....
In historically the most serious felony, treason, an individual with knowledge of
the treason can be prosecuted for concealing and failing to disclose it .... In other felonies,
both at common law and under the criminal law of the United States, an individual knowing
of the commission of a felony is criminally liable for concealing it and failing to make it
known to proper authority . ... But this crime, known as misprision of felony, has always
been limited to knowledge and concealment of felony and has never extended to misdemeanor ....
We believe the distinction between the obligations arising from knowledge of
a felony and those arising from knowledge of a misdemeanor continues to reflect basic
human feelings about the duties owed by individuals to society. Heinous crime must be
stamped out, and its suppression is the responsibility of all.... Venial crime and crime not
evil in itself present less of a danger to society, and perhaps the benefits of their suppression
through the modem equivalent of the posse, the hue and cry, the informant, and the
citizen's arrest, are outweighed by the disruption to everyday life brought about by amateur
law enforcement and private officiousness in relatively inconsequential delicts which do not
threaten our basic security." [citations omitted]. People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471, 481,
59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 634 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
It remains, then, only to consider simultaneously both the burden placed on the individual and the gain realized by society in order to evaluate the appropriateness of a misprision statute. Acknowledging such a cost-benefit analysis in a case involving another type
of criminal omission, the Supreme Court held in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1971):
"Tension between the State's demand for disclosure and the protection of the right against
self-incrimination is likely to give rise to serious questions. Inevitably these must be resolved
in terms of balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individual's claim to constitutonal protections on the other."
23. For example, in Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 556 (1822), defendant was
charged with fraud for his attempt to conceal a forgery committed by his son-in-law.
24. There are no recorded cases of misprision of treason. In one case purporting to deal
with the crime of misprision of treason, the court apparently was dealing instead with a mild
form of actual treason. See Respublica v. Weidle, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 88, 89 (Pa. App. 1781)
(defendant's spoken veneration for Ireland and England constituted a misprision of treason).
25. See, e.g., People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 471, 481, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 634 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1967); Moore v. State, 94 Ga. App. 210, 211, 94 S.E.2d 80, 83 (1956) (court noted that
"mere concealment alone of crime, with the exception of the offense of treason ... constitutes
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fore, to the degree that possession of two marijuana plants arguably represents
less of a threat to the social order than does a murder or kidnapping, it appears less suitable to serve as the subject-matter crime in a misprision case. 2 6
The second important factor militating against a conviction in Holland
was the means by which the evidence against the assistant was procured. Holland discovered the marijuana when he drove, unannounced, to the assistant's
home, knocked on the door and, receiving no response, went behind the house
to look for him. It was only then that he discovered the marijuana plants
growing in the assistant's back yard. For the purposes of this commentary, it is
irrelevant whether this seizure violated the assistant's fourth amendment
rights. 27 It is more important to consider, in light of the social function that
misprision is supposed to facilitate, 28 the extent to which the existence of the
crime might encourage incidents of "snooping," which could result in breaches
29
of the peace.
Although Holland represented a misprision case unusually replete with the
crime's characteristic defects, the case did not include perhaps the most serious
shortcoming. The holding in Commonwealth v. Lopes, 30 one of the two cases
in which the requirement of an evil motive was added to the crime,31 was
partly motivated by the court's concern for the probable self-incrimination of
the defendant were he to have reported the crime. 32 Lopes was charged with
misprision for the failure to report to the police his discovery of the body of a
ten-year-old girl for whom police had been searching for several days. By
chance, Lopes and a woman had the misfortune to stumble upon the body
while on a mutually adulterous excursion deep into the Massachusetts woods.
Out of fear of publicity, both parties then decided to "conceal" their discovery.
no offense in this State"). See also Frankel, supra note 4, at 416 n.165 (list of 14 states with
misprision of treason statutes).
26. See State v. Michaud, 150 Me. 479, 114 A.2d 352 (1955), where the subject-matter
crime involved adultery. See text accompanying notes 38-39 infra.
27. Initially, a court would have to determine whether Holland was acting under color
of state law because the fourth amendment does not restrict the searches made by private individuals. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 373 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1967) (motel operator not
covered by fourth amendment when he makes search). See generally Stapleton v. Superior
Court, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575, 447 P.2d 967 (1969); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 195 (4th ed. 1974). Even were Holland's state agent status established, a complex question would arise concerning the reasonableness of the assistant's
expectation of privacy in the location in which he grew the marijuana plants. See, e.g., 23
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 63, 67-72 (1974).
28. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 150: "[E]ven apart from [misprison's] immediate practical
consequences, its existence might renew a sense of communal responsibility."
29. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 4, at 426 (because of the vagueness of misprision, individuals may feel compelled to snoop as they attempt to satisfy their nebulous duty to report crime). This would, of course, detract from the social function that misprision is designed to serve. See notes 22 and 28 supra.
30. 318 Mass. 453, 61 N.E.2d 849 (1945).
31. The other case was State v. Wilson, 80 Vt. 249, 67 A. 533 (1907).
32. See State v. Michaud, 150 Me. 479, 492, 114 A.2d 352, 358 (1955) (Webber, J., concurring): the court will include the additional element of an evil motive so as to avoid punishment in cases where "the concealment is motivated by some natural reluctance which may
stem from timidity or aversion to publicity, or ...a desire to avoid self-incrmination."
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The court dismissed the charge because Lopes did not intend by his conceal33
ment "to prevent or delay the administration of Justice."
Out of similar concern with the problem of self-incrimination, 34 federal
courts, interpreting the federal misprision statute,3 5 have long attempted to
limit the scope of the crime by attaching to it the additional element of a positive act of concealment. 36 State courts have also taken advantage of this limiting
device in order to avoid unjust applications of misprision statutes. 37 In State v.
Michaud,38 the court was confronted with two problems considered in Holland:
the quality of the knowledge required of the defendant before she could be
considered capable of concealment and the nature of the crimes whose concealment would merit prosecution. The defendant was charged with misprision
for her failure to report to police her "knowledge," which was gained through
rumor and gossip rather than direct observation, of a couple's adulterous affair.
Requiring that the knowledge be personal rather than secondhand, the court
proceeded to limit the crime further by also requiring a positive act of concealment.2 9
The requirements of an evil motive or positive act of concealment belie the
true cause for most adverse holdings against misprision. Courts employing such
readings of the crime have strained to reinterpret misprision in such ways as to
limit greatly the applicability of a crime whose contours are, at times, impermissibly vague. More than one judge, however, has noted that the unstated
effect of these attempts has been simply to eliminate the crime of misprision by
merging it into other criminal categories such as accessory after the fact, obstructing justice, or compounding a felony.40 The fundamental basis, then, for
33. Commonwealth v. Lopes, 318 Mass. 453, 459, 61 N.E.2d 849, 852 (1945).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Pigott, 453 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir. 1970) ("the statute does not purport to punish solely for
failure to report facts which he has a reasonable fear might lead to his conviction of crime");
United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1968) (individual not required to report
crime if he has a "reasonable cause to fear he might thereby be convicted of that crime").
35. 18 U.S.C. §4 (1970).
36. Sullivan v. United States, 411 F.2d 556, 558 (10th Cir. 1969); Lancey v. United States,
356 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1966); Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d 643, 646 (8th Cir. 1939);
Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795, 798 (10th Cir. 1934); United States v. Farrar, 38 F.2d
515, 517 (D. Mass.), af'd, 281 U.S. 624 (1930). See generally Shannonhouse III, Misprision of
a FederalFelony: DangerousRelic or Scourge of Malfeasance?, 4 U. BALT. L. REv. 59 (1974).
37. See notes 13 and 32 supra.
38. 150 Me. 479, 114 A.2d 352 (1955).
39. Id. at 483, 114 A.2d at 354.
40. Id. at 491, 114 A.2d at 358 (Webber, J., concurring): "[r]he practical result of requiring the pleading of positive acts would be to destroy any distinction between misprision
of felony and the crime of being an accessory after the fact." One court has equated the two
crimes. State v. Graham, 190 La. 669, 680, 182 So. 711, 714 (1938); cf. United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119, 1129 (7th Cir. 1970) (court found narrow distinction between misprision
and accessory after the fact solely on the basis of the absence of an interest to benefit the
principal actor in misprision; however, the court concluded, "most instances of misprision involve, in actuality, being an accessory after the fact"). Contra, Sykes v. Director of Public
Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 528, 561-62, 45 Crim. App. 230, 247-49 (1961) (court distinguished
misprision from accessory after the fact, compounding a felony, and obstruction of justice);
R. v. Crimmins, [1959] Vict. 270, 273 (1959) (court istinguished misprision from compound-
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a judicial repudiation of misprision remains the philosophical dissatisfaction
with the crime expressed by the court in Holland. These courts found that the
crime of misprision was philosophically incompatible with the attitudes and
needs of contemporary society or, more precisely, that the social benefits in
terms of reduced crime to be derived by application of misprision were outweighed by the social costs in terms of sacrificed personal freedoms.
JUDICIAL ENDORSEMENT OF MISPRISION

As is apparent from the cases in which courts have repudiated the crime of
misprision, it is vagueness regarding the scope of the crime that is the cause of
most of misprision's serious weaknesses. Legal writers, as well as courts, while
sometimes conceding the place of such a crime in modern society, have singled
out as a fatal flaw the uncertainty of the behavior involved in misprision.4 1 A
few courts, noting the characteristic vagueness of the offense, have given effect
to it by implying conditions of reasonableness as elements of the crime.
With one exception' 2 the American courts recognizing the crime of misprision have done so through the interpretation of express misprision statutes
rather than through an interpretation of the general common law offense. Although states have used misprision terminology in statutes defining an accessory
after the fact,4 3 courts, finding such language to be inadvertent, have typically

44
held that the statutes pertained solely to the active crime of accessory. Colorado, however, until recently provided for a misprision-like offense within the

statute defining an accessory before the fact. The relevant portion of the statute

read:
An accessory during the fact is a person who stands by, without interfering or giving such help as he4 may in his power to prevent a criminal offense from being committed.

5

ing a felony on basis of profit motive present in the latter crime); Shannonhouse III, supra
note 36, at 71-74 (description of misprision's relation to similar crimes).
41. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 4, at 60: "On grounds of public policy, there is much to
command [misprision laws] at the present time; but its greatest weakness is that it leaves too
much 'quasi-judicial' discretion to the police." See note 17 supra.
42. State v. Flynn, 100 R.I. 520, 217 A.2d 432 (1966); cf. State v. Young, 7 Ohio App. 2d
194, 220 N.E.2d 146 (1966) (court could not recognize misprision because Ohio had not
adopted common law crimes).
accessory
43. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-120 (1964): "Accessory after the fact. -An
after the fact is a person who after full knowledge that a crime has been committed, conceals
it from the magistrate, or harbors and protects the person charged with or found guilty of
the crime."

44. See, e.g., Fields v. State, 213 Ark. 899, 901-02, 214 S.W.2d 230, 231 (1948) (Arkansas
statute, see note 43 supra, interpreted to require an affirmative act).
45. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §40-1-12 (1963) (originally enacted in 1861; repealed in 1971).
The failure of this statute to distinguish more clearly between the unusual crime of accessory
during the fact and the more familiar crimes of accessory before and after the fact produced
much confusion among courts trying to apply the statute. See, e.g., Martinez v. People, 166
Colo. 524, 526-29, 444 P.2d 641, 642-43 (1968)

(court distinguished between accessory during

the fact and other forms of accessorial liability).
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The first instance in which a court applied this portion of the statute to a
case involving bystander indifference occurred when a man stood by without
offering aid while a woman was assaulted and robbed of her jewelry.4 Although impliedly recognizing the validity of the offense, the court, dismissing
the indictment for vagueness, inferred from the statute an important condition
of reasonableness. "The law does not require [defendant] to hazard his personal
safety... The indictment should show what it was in his power to do without
placing himself in peril." 47 This court recognized by implication that it was
necessary to the balancing of the individual and societal interests involved in
any determination of misprision that the indictment have specified the extent
to which the individual could have reasonably been expected to sacrifice his
personal freedom and safety in complying with the law, especially in cases involving the rescue of the victim rather than the mere timely reporting of the
crime.
The scope of misprision has been similarly limited by implied conditions of
reasonableness in the application of a New Jersey statute prohibiting concealment of crimes. 48 In an early case interpreting the predecessor of the modern
New Jersey statute,4 9 the court reaffirmed the misprision-like nature of the offense by requiring for the crime only the passive "act of silence." 50 In subsequent cases, New Jersey courts read into the statute implied conditions that the
law did not require the concealer to incriminate himself 5' and that the crime
itself was limited to the concealment of "high misdemeanors," which excluded
such petty misdemeanors as illegal betting.52
The leading misprision case involved merely an interpretation of the crime
as it existed at common law and not in any statutory reformulation. In the
English case of Sykes v. Director of Public Prosecutions,53 the defendant was
accused of being the intermediary between a group of thieves who had stolen a
large supply of weapons and a prospective buyer who claimed to be a representative of the Irish Republican Army. Because the evidence was considered
insufficient to support the conviction of Sykes as an accessory, the prosecution
proceeded successfully on a theory of the common law crime of misprision. On
appeal, the House of Lords affirmed, holding that the crime of misprision still
existed and that it required no affirmative act of concealment. 54
Since the concealed crime in Sykes was one capable of producing much
volence, it is therefore not surprising that the court, after weighing the oppos46. Farrell v. People, 8 Colo. App. 524, 46 P. 841 (1896).
47. Id. at 526, 46 P. at 842.
48. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:97-2 (1969) (originally enacted in 1898): "Any person having
knowledge of the actual commission within the jurisdiction of this state of arson, manslaughter, murder, or of any high misdemeanor, who conceals it and does not, as soon as may
be, disclose and make known the same to a judge, magistrate, prosecutor, or police authority,
is guilty of a misdemeanor."

49. State v. Hann, 40 N.J.L. 228 (1878) (court, referring to "twenty-first section of the
crimes act," applied predecessor of New Jersey statute. See note 48 supra).

50. 40 NJ.L. at 229.
51.

State v. Raymond, 78 N.J.L. 61, 63, 78 A. 761, 762 (1909) (dictum).

52. State v. Van Bueren, 13 NJ. Super. 592, 594, 81 A.2d 42, 43 (1951).
53. [1962] A.C. 528, 45 Crim. App. 230 (1961).
54. Id. at 560, 563-64, 45 Crim. App. at 246, 249-50.
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ing societal and individual interests, endorsed the crime of misprision. Nevertheless, the Sykes court took great care to determine the "just limitations"55 to
misprision. Although noting the social pressures requiring the retention of the
offense, 5 6 the court restricted the scope of the offense by finding that misprision
required a personal, reasonable knowledge - not mere gossip or rumor - of a
"serious offense" and a passive concealment of the offense, which implied, not
a failure to rescue, 5 7 but only a failure to report the offense to the proper
authorities.5 8
THE RELATION OF MISPRISION TO THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

Misprision cases demand that courts resolve the question whether such a
crime of omission, as applied to the facts of a particular case, is philosophically
compatible with the needs and attitudes of contemporary society. Some cases
have revealed that when the fact situations are such that the application of misprision would represent an unacceptably extreme restraint on personal freedom, courts will repudiate the crime. The basic philosophical considerations,
however, remain constant in all misprision cases.
Although other benefits are conceivable, 59 the immediate social benefit to be
derived from criminalizing the "act" of misprision is evident - crime reduction.
Even the critics of misprision laws have conceded the effectiveness of such laws
in reducing crime.60 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice (President's Commission) found a correlation between crime solution and the immediacy of police response.6 1 Furthermore,
anticipated bystander indifference may actually encourage crime. In the
Genovese case, for instance, police later reported that the murderer had consciously taken advantage of the apathy of the witnesses in his assault.62 The
President's Commission found that the most important opportunity available
to the average citizen in his attempt to reduce crime was to report all crime to
55. Id. at 564, 45 Crim. App. at 251.
56. Id. at 569, 45 Crim. App. at 256-57.
57. Note, however, the rescue requirement in many civil law jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
FRENCH PENAL CODE, Art. 63 (The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, G. Mueller ed.
1960), cited in S. KADISH 9. M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 213 (1969): "Any
person who, by his immediate action and without danger to himself or others, could have
prevented either a felonious act or a misdemeanor against the person, willfully fails to do so,

shall be punished .... Any person who willfully fails to render or to obtain assistance to an
endangered person when such was possible without danger to himself or others, shall be subject to like punishments."

58.

[1962] A.C. at 563-64, 45 Crim. App. at 249-50 (1961).

59.

See note 28 supra.

60.

See note 41 supra.

61.

THE PRESIDENT'S COMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 97

(1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COM-

MISSION].

62. LIFE, Apr. 10, 1964, at 21. In this article, the detective in charge of the Genovese
murder, Lt. Bernard Jacobs, was quoted as saying: "'You know what this man told us after
we caught him? . . . He said he figured nobody would do anything to help. He heard the
windows go up and saw the lights go on. He just retreated for a while and when things
quieted down, he came back to finish the job.'" Id.
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the police.63 The Commission suggested not only that the law enforcement
specialist alone could not control crime, but that the complexity of modem
urban life should not be allowed to disguise the need for the traditionally
active community response to crime. In fact, the Commission, after noting the
existence of state misprision-like statutes, proceeded to declare that, even in the
absence of such laws, the citizen should nevertheless consider himself obligated
to assist the police through crime reporting. 64
To a large extent, the finding of such a legal duty on the part of a citizen
to report crime is predicated upon an analysis of crime and its effect on the
typical individual. The question in misprision cases always remains, of course,
whether the sacrifice of certain negative freedoms, such as the freedom not to
respond to the crime victim's pleas for help, is worth the attainment of certain
positive freedoms, such as the freedom to live one's life relatively unworried by
crime.65 Most American courts have decided this question in the negative, sharing the attitude of the Holland court:
The fear of such a consequence [the conviction resulting from the failure to report crime] is a fear from which our traditional concepts of
peace and quietude guarantee freedom. We cherish the right to mind
our business when our own best interests dictate. 66
Yet society's conception of its own best interests is largely dependent on its
impression of the significance of the crime problem, which is determined by
the actual and perceived incidence of crime and the ensuing public reaction.
The magnitude of actual crime today in this country is undeniably great.
Rates of reported crime are constantly on the rise.6 7 Estimates vary as to the
degree to which American citizens are directly the victims of crime. The President's Commission found in 1966 that the annual probability of "serious personal attack" on an American was 1 in 550.68 A recent Gallup poll found that:
nationally one out of every five Americans was a victim of one or more
"serious crimes" during the last year. 69 Nor is the problem any longer primarily
limited to the larger cities. Recently-released statistics from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation indicate that the occurrence of serious crime is increasing in
small cities and suburban areas at a rate three times greater than the rate of
70
increase in more densely populated areas.
63.
64.

PaREsEDEN's CommissoN, supra note 61, at 288.

Id.

65. See note 22 supra. Because of an actual conflict between a negative and positive freedom in this case, there is little value in resorting to the traditional western notion of the

purpose of government, such as is expressed in the statement, "'Whatever may be the ultimate aim or tendency of the law, its direct object is the attainment of freedom.'" A. KACOUREK, JURAL RELATiONS 15

(2d ed. 1927), cited in Snyder, Liability for Negligent Conduct,

35 VA. L. REv. 446, 450-51 (1949).

66. Holland v. State, 302 So. 2d 806, 810 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1974).
67. Recently released FBI statistics indicated that crime was up 16% in the first nine
months of 1974. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Dec. 27, 1974, §A, at 9, cols. 1-2.
68.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note

61, at 18.

69. GALLUP POLL INDEX, Report No. 91, Jan. 1973, at 11 ("serious crime" included mugging, robbery and burglary).
70. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Dec. 27, 1974, §A, at 9, cols. 1-2.
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The President's Commission found one of the most serious and damaging
byproducts of crime is fear."' In one poll, approximately one out of six Americans admitted that fear of crime recently prevented them from leaving their
homes at night.72 In another poll, about the same percentage of persons interviewed indicated that they did not feel safe and secure in their homes at
night. 3 Responding to queries over a period from 1967 through 1972 concerning fear of walking alone at night within one mile of one's home, the percentage of those polled expressing such fear rose nationally from 31 to 41 percent; during the same period in cities of over one million population, the in74
crease was from 38 to 53 percent
Not surprisingly, the public, impatient and dissatisfied with present law
enforcement programs, desires change in the criminal justice system. Over 70
percent of the persons responding on a nationwide basis to a Harris poll taken
in 1970 opined that the present system of law enforcement did not discourage
people from committing crime. In fact, three percent of those polled felt compelled to ignore the stated alternatives and instead volunteered their belief that
the present system actually encourages crime. 75 Nor are the changes desired entirely of an "electrocute-the-shoplifter" variety. By a two-to-one margin, these
persons preferred that police concern themselves with the less dramatic activity
of crime prevention rather than with capturing existing criminals.,; Much of
the public sentiment toward change in law enforcement practices favors simply
a rededication of the community to the direct fight against crime. An overwhelming 87 percent of those interviewed nationwide in 1968 reported willingness to work with local police in community anti-crime operations and "report
on any suspicious activity in [their] neighborhood[s].."'7
The mere existence of a nascent public recognition of the indispensable role
of communal responsibility in the fight against crime does not, of course, imply
a concomitant public readiness to accept criminal sanctions for failure to report crime. This developing public awareness does, however, represent a
foundation upon which more elaborate social expressions of communal responsibility can be erected in acordance with one of the major findings of the
President's Commission:
America must translate its well-founded alarm about crime into social
action that will prevent crime ....

To speak of controlling crime only

in terms of the work of the police, the courts and the correctional apparatus is to refuse to face the fact that
widespread crime implies a
8
widespread failure by society as a whole.7
71.
72.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 3, 52.

73.

Id. at 14.

Id. at 51.

74. U.S. DEPARTMENr OF JusTIcE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1973, tables
2.21-2.23 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SOURCEIOOK].
75.
76.
77.

Id., table 2.13.
Id., table 2.12.
Id., table 2.16. Note, in this respect, the dramatic emergence of community sur-

veillance groups surveyed in Marx & Archer, Citizen Involvement in the Law Enforcement
Process, 15 Am. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 52 (1971).
78. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 74, at 75.
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Part of this "social action" includes a reassertion of communal responsibility, which may be generated in part by the introduction into society of a
misprision-like crime of omission.79 The suggestion by some that "the appearance of specialized and paid law enforcement officers" precludes the necessity
for communal responsibility in this area s o recently has been seriously questioned."' There is a recognition of the fact that, in the words of the President's
Commission:
Finally, no system, however well-staffed or organized, no level of material well-being for all, will rid society of crime if there is not a widespread ethical motivation, and a widespread belief that by and large the2
government and the social order deserve credence, respect and loyalty.
It is uncertain whether, at present, the social order can command greater
public credence, respect, and loyalty, in terms of expressions of communal
responsibility, than can the notion of fredom that embraces the dubious personal right to ignore the victim's cries for help. At some point, however, as
awareness of the increasing interdependency characteristic of modem life
grows, a broad-based recognition of society's own best interests will necessitate
a reassertion of communal responsibility,83 as society comes to realize, in the
language of Durkheim, that:
79. Most of the legal writers considering the matter of crimes of omission have concluded
that modern social conditions increasingly demand the presence of such laws. See, e.g., Hughes,
Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 634 (1958) ("the time has come for Anglo-American
systems to translate into legislative fact the modern consciousness of interdependence");
Kirchheimer, Criminal Omissions, 55 HARV. L. Rv.615 (1942); Snyder, supra note 65, at 479
(the great shift in legal science has been from what man does to what he ought to do, from
act to duty). "A narrow conception of the duty to assist others has been regarded as the expression of an individualistic order of society. But this emphasis on one aspect of a larger
problem perhaps belongs itself to a period of the past. The conception of an isolated individual whose legal obligations are few compared to his range of possible activity deviates
from the facts of present-day society. A greater amount of group dependency on the part of
each individual as well as a steady increase in the number of affirmative duties established by
statute is discernible everywhere. The problem of finding sufficient legal basis for affirmative
duties thus becomes less acute than it was under a more individualistic form of society."
Kirchheimer, supra, at 641-42.
80. Holland v.State, 302 So. 2d 806, 809 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); accord, Frankel, supra
note 4, at 418.
81. Some social scientists suggest that the division of labor implicit in modem specialization actually encourages crime. See generally E. DURmHEIm, THE DIvIsION OF LABOR m Socmv
(1933; The Free Press 1964). This aspect of Durkheim's thesis was corroborated in Webb,
Crime and the Division of Labor: Testing a Durkheimian Model, 78 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY

643, 650, 653 (1972). See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
82. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 6.
83. See note 80 supra. Consider also the broad dictum (as to duty at least) by the Supreme Court in In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895): "It is the duty and the right, not
only of every peace officer of the United States, but of every citizen, to assist in prosecuting,
and in securing the punishment of, any breach of the peace of the United States. It is the
right, as well as the duty, of every citizen, when called upon by the proper officer, to act as
part of the posse comitatus in upholding the laws of his country. It is likewise his right and
his duty to communicate to the executive officers any information which he has of the commission of an offence against those laws.....
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Altruism is not ...a sort of agreeable ornament to social life but is its
fundamental basis. Men cannot live together without acknowledging,
84
and consequently making, mutual sacrifices.
RECOMMENDATION

It is impossible to give statutory effect to the common law crime of misprision without severely qualifying the elements of the offense. As apparent in
virtually all misprision cases and as stated by the Sykes court, it is imperative
that the law in the area of criminal omissions be "administered with dignity
and common sense."' 5 Common sense or reasonableness, of course, demands
that a misprision statute not interfere with a defendant's fifth amendment right
against compelled self-incrimination s 6 Furthermore, public policy demands
that the crime reporter not engage in intrusive behavior that would tend to
encourage breaches of the peace.8 7 It is therefore advisable that the crime reporter, although not literally a state agent,88 be considered a state agent within
the meaning of the fourth amendment for the purpose of regulating the scope
of his searches and seizures and thereby insuring the subject of the report
s9
freedom from "snooping." !
Reasonableness also requires greater specificity in light of the characteristic
vagueness of the crime of misprision. It is necessary that any rational misprision statute demand that the reporter's knowledge of the crime be the result of direct, personal observation, in order to guarantee greater accuracy in
reporting as well as to avoid placing too burdensome a duty on the would-be
reporter. 90 It is also necessary to limit the crimes capable of concealment under
the statute to only the most serious. As in the case of misprision of treason, 91
only the gravest crimes are capable of satisfying the balancing test in terms of
92
the conflicting social and personal interests present in misprision cases.
Furthermore, it is necessary that the statute specify that the action required of
the witness is only that of timely reporting, not rescue, and that this requiremen need be satisfied only in such a way as avoids placing the reporter in
bodily danger. 93 As in the case of many statutes dealing with accessory offenses, 94 policy may preclude the application of this statute to witnesses of
crime committed by close relatives. 95 And, lastly, reasonableness suggests that

84. E.
85.

DURKHEIM,

supra note 81, at 228.

Sykes v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [19621 A.C. 528, 569, 45 Crim. App. 230, 257

(1961).
86. See text accompanying notes 30-36 supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
88. See note 27 supra.
89. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 19 and 38-39 supra.
91. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
92. See note 22 supra.Reference to a jurisdiction's felony-murder rule, if it has one, might
reveal those felonies that are considered most serious within a particular jurisdiction.
93. See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
94. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §776.03 (1973).
95. Contra, State v. Biddle, 32 Del. 401, 124 A. 804 (1923) (wife, after witnessing her
husband commit robbery, was held subject as a matter of law to a misprision-like statute for
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the punishment for the offense remain slight - certainly less than that accorded
the active, intentional crimes of accessory after the fact, obstruction of justice,
or compounding a felony - in recognition of the public's relative unfamiliarity
98
with crimes of omission.
A possible statutory reformulation of the common law crime of misprision
of felony might, therefore, include the following provisions:
Any person who, not the spouse, parent, child, brother, sister, grandparent, or grandchild of the actor, personally perceives or should reasonably have personally perceived, in a manner that would be constitutionally permissible were he a state agent, the commission of murder,
arson, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, or aggravated assault, and who
fails to report to the police as soon as possible the commission of this
crime, is himself guilty of the misdemeanor of misprision of felony.
The duty to report such a crime shall not be extended to a person
who reasonably believes that, by so reporting, he will incriminate himself either in this crime or in any other, or to a person who reasonably
believes that, by so reporting, he will place himself in danger of serious
bodily injury.
Violation of this statute shall result in a maximum penalty of $100
or 3 days in jail or both.
This statutory reformulation of misprision avoids the excessive restraints on
personal liberty inherent in the common law crime, as revealed by judicial
analysis, but at the same time serves the societal need for crime control through
the imposition of a crime of omission capable of contributing to the reassertion
of the communal responsibility that is essential to any relatively crime-free society.
ROBERT E. MEALE

her failure to report crime to the police, but jury acquitted her); Sykes v. Director of Public
Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 528, 564, 569, 45 Crim. App. 230, 251, 257 (1961).
96. Note the existence, though, of other crimes of omission with which the public is expected to comply. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. App. §462 (1970) (Selective Service registration requirements) and typical statute requiring motorist involved in accident to stop, identify himself,
and render aid if necessary, e.g., FLA. STAT. §316.027 (1973). Both of these forms of criminal
liability based on omission have been validated by courts. See, e.g., California v. Byers, 402
U.S. 424 (1971) (Supreme Court held similar California statute requiring a motorist to stop
not to be in violation of fifth amendment); Whitney v. United States, 328 F.2d 888, 889 (5th
Cir. 1964) (court required willful neglect of known duty with respect to Selective Service obligations, thereby tempering somewhat the effect of the law); In re Jones, 130 Fla. 667, 178
So. 424 (1938) (court held FLA. STAT. §317.091, which was the predecessor to §316.027, constitutional).
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